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This study is intended to provide a critical overview of the local
government finance reform and analyze the process of strength-
ening financial decentralization in Bulgaria. First of all, the speci-
fics of government structure and the main components of the le-
gal base in the scope of local self-government are presented. The
quantitative analysis is focused on dynamics of the public expen-
diture indicators and the structure of local revenues, based on
fact figures for the period 1990–2011 and forecast for 2012. The
influence of economic crises on local government finance is dis-
cussed and estimated. A comparison is drawn between the three
most severe downturns of Bulgarian economy during the last 20
years, namely the price liberalization in the beginning of transi-
tion (1991–1993), the credit crunch and series of bank bankrupt-
cies, which caused the financial crisis in 1996–1997, and the cur-
rent worldwide crisis. Some of the most important actions, taken
by the government in order to consolidate the crisis are described
and evaluated on the base of their effects on the local finance.
The conclusion is that although the current crisis reached Bul-
garia at comparatively mature stage of financial decentralization
reform, municipalities can do very little without active central
government support and cannot substitute for it in regard of the
basic anti-crisis measures.
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Introduction
The process of decentralizing public sector in Bulgaria started par-
allel to the transition from a planned, socialist type economy to-
ward marked based economy. During the last 20 years a remarkable
progress has been achieved, although local government finance re-
form in Bulgaria proved to be a very long and difficult process. The
main purpose of this paper is to provide a critical overview of the lo-
cal government finance reform and analyze the process of strength-
ening financial decentralization in Bulgaria. It is structured in five
sections. Section two introduces the specifics of country’s govern-
ment structure and presents the legal base of local self-government.
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table 1 Dynamics of administrative and territorial structure
Year Regions Districts Municipalities
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1950 — — 14 516 300 2 178 3 300
1961 — — 28 261 000 979 8 000
1979 — — 28 315 900 291 30 400
1987 — — 9 997 400 273 32 900
1999 — — 28 284 800 262 30 300
2006 6 1 280 000 28 280 000 264 29 900
2011 6 1 230 000 28 263 000 264 27 900
notes Column headings are as follows: (1) number, (2) average population. Source:
National Statistical Institute (http://www.nsi.bg).
Third section traces out the main stages in the evolution of financial
decentralization. The role of different governmental tiers within the
public sector of the country is analyzed on the base of the dynam-
ics of public expenditures indicators. Development of the financial
decentralization process is assessed through the relative importance
of the local expenditures both in the consolidated public expendi-
tures and the gdp. Special emphasis is placed upon the evolution
of local budgets revenue structure over the period 1991–2012. The
relative share of own-source revenues is analyzed as a precondition
for expanding local financial autonomy. Fourth section illustrates the
impact of economic crises on the local government finance. The last
section concludes.
Foundations of the Local Self-Government in Bulgaria
government structure
Government structure of Bulgaria is not very fragmented. Due to the
five administrative reforms, which have been conducted during the
second half of the 20th century, the number of the administrative-
territorial units at different levels decreased. Presently, as a unitary
state, with 7.4 million population and territory of 111 000 km2, Bul-
garia enjoys comparatively simple subordination scheme. Territo-
rial structure of the country includes two regions on level nuts i,
6 regions, defined as level nuts ii, 28 administrative districts corre-
sponding to level nuts iii, and 264 municipalities, which represent
the level lau 1.1
It is important to note, that regions are not administrative, but only
statistical units, created according to the Regional Development Act
(‘Zakon za regionalnoto razvitie’ 2008, §4) and in compliance with
the requirements of the European Union for allocation of regional
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development funds. The districts are deconcentrated administrative
units of the central government, which coordinate national and lo-
cal interests, but they neither enjoy financial autonomy, nor pro-
vide public services to the population. According to the Constitution
(‘Konstitucia na Republika Bulgaria’ 1991, §136), the municipality –
a legal entity is the only one tier of really autonomous subnational
government in the country. It has the right of ownership and adopts
independent municipal budget, which must be used in the interests
of the local population. The bodies of local government – Municipal
Council and Mayor – are elected directly by the local population for a
4-year mandate with the purpose to make and perform local govern-
ment decisions. The last local elections held in 2011, elected respec-
tively 264 mayors and 264 municipal councils with 5 145 municipal
councilors. Men prevailed among themunicipal councilor seat takers
(71.6%).
legal grounds of financial decentralization
The basic principles of local self-government in Bulgaria are pro-
vided by the Constitution, adopted by the Parliament in 1991 (‘Kon-
stitucia na Republika Bulgaria’ 1991). In addition, there is a package
of laws, shaping the legal grounds of decentralization. The Local
Self-Government and Local Administration Act (‘Zakon za mest-
noto samoupravlenie i mestnata administracia’ 1991) regulate orga-
nization and functions of local governments. The Act on Adminis-
trative and Territorial Structure of the Republic of Bulgaria (1995)
determines the legal criteria and procedures for establishing, merg-
ing, splitting and liquidating administrative units. The Local Elec-
tions Act (‘Zakon za mestnite izbori’ 1995) and the Referendum Act
(1996) prescribe the rules for citizens’ participation in political pro-
cess at local level. The issues of acquiring and managing munici-
pal property are solved by the Municipal Property Act (‘Zakon za
obshtinskata sobstvenost’ 1996), while procedure and organization
of the municipal budgeting process are formalized by the Munic-
ipal Budgets Act (‘Zakon za obshtinskite budjeti’ 1998). Some im-
portant financial issues as type, base, and rate of local taxes and
charges are specified by the Local Taxes and Fees Act (‘Zakon za
mestnite danaci i taksi’ 1997), whereas the procedure, conditions
and limits of local debt service are determined by the Municipal
Debt Act (‘Zakon za obshtinskia dulg’ 2005). Thus, the most im-
portant legal pillars of the local self-government are stipulated,
providing a stable base for expanding financial decentralization
in Bulgaria. This is in consistence with the efforts of the eu coun-
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tries for strengthening the legal base of government decentralization
(Patonov 2011, 37)
Local Government Finance
evolution of financial decentralization
Local government finance reform in Bulgaria proved to be a very
long and difficult process. Decentralization of the public sector was
conducted by the transition process, from centralized, socialist type
economy to a market based economy, which started in 1990. Basi-
cally, the process of reforming local finance comprised of several dis-
tinct periods. During the first period, in the very beginning of transi-
tion (1991–1993) the highly centralized system was preserved. The
independence of municipal budgets within the consolidated state
budget was acknowledged in 1993, meaning that the State aban-
doned centralization of local budgetary surplus and financing of lo-
cal deficit. In addition, the intergovernmental fiscal relations were
organized on the base of a newly introduced formula for distribution
of the state subsidies to the municipal budgets.
The second period started in 1994, parallel to the process of grad-
ually building the capacities of local authorities. The National As-
sociation of Municipalities in Republic of Bulgaria (namrb) and re-
gional associations of municipalities emerged as main champions of
financial decentralization. Several changes in intergovernmental re-
lations were provoked, gradually eliminating mandatory priorities
in the allocation of municipal expenditures. However, to the end of
2002, the intergovernmental fiscal relations remained centralized as
far as the central government established a model of almost com-
plete control over the municipal budgets (Thcavdarova, Ivanov, and
Savov 2000, 36)
During the third period the real financial decentralization in Bul-
garia evolved. It was initiated in 2003, based on the Cooperation
Agreement, signed by the Council of Ministers and the namrb in
2002, whereby both parties agreed to decentralize local government
and to increase financial independence of municipalities. Moreover,
both the Financial Decentralization Concept and the program for its
implementation were adopted. As a result, one of the main achieve-
ments in the scope of intergovernmental fiscal relations became a
reality, namely the clear division between the local and central re-
sponsibilities for the public services. Provided for the first time by
the Annual State Budget Act for 2003 (‘Zakon za darjavnia budget
na Republika Bulgaria’ 2003) it was continued and improved during
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the following years. Additionally, this law provided a framework for
regulating a new, simple and transparent model of assigning gov-
ernment subsidies. As a result subsidies allocation is based on a for-
mula, which takes into account the expenditure needs and revenue
capacity of local governments.
The lack of local tax autonomy has been a fundamental weakness
of the revenue assignment system in Bulgaria during the transition
period. Before the constitutional amendments in the beginning of
2007 Bulgarian municipalities were prohibited from setting either
rates or bases of local taxes. Property tax, motor vehicle tax, inheri-
tance tax, donation tax, and tax on the real estate and movable prop-
erty purchase, recognized as local taxes, were entirely regulated by
the central governmental level. In this respect local taxes in Bulgaria
have been considered as special transfers, based on the location of
taxable property.
This is the reason why, 2007 can be pointed as a beginning of
the fourth period, when two important legislative changes consider-
ably influenced local taxation. Firstly, municipalities were given the
authority to set local tax rates within certain legal limits. However,
they are still disallowed to define local tax base and provide addi-
tional (or remove the existing) legal alleviations for certain taxpay-
ers. Secondly, the patent tax was reassigned as a local tax. Basically,
the patent tax is a net annual income tax, which is collected from
the craftsmen and the owners of small enterprises, who offer hand-
made products and a variety of services. The patent tax replaces the
payment of personal income tax or corporate income tax, so it has
the potential as an important part of local revenues and powerful
instrument of the municipal tax policy.
local government expenditure
During the transition period public sector expenditures have been
very dynamic, in response to the fast-changing legal and financial
environment. Due to the economic stagnation, financial instability,
and vertical imbalance in the last decade of the 20th century, the
relative importance of local governments within the governmental
system decreased. Moreover, regardless of the financial stabilization
and economic growth, achieved during the first years of the 21st cen-
tury, the downward tendency has proved its persistency. The relative
share of local budgets in gdp has been reduced to 7.5% in 2000 and
6.1% in 2004 by comparison with 12.3% in 1990. At the same time
expenditures of the local governments, which formed 21.5% of the
consolidated state budget in 1991, reached respectively 17.9% in 2000
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table 2 Dynamics of the public expenditure indicators
(1) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(2) 51.11 53.66 56.09 54.41 49.09 43.65 34.29 38.45 40.52 41.99 40.45
(3) 10.95 13.04 11.30 9.24 7.71 6.34 5.68 7.40 7.84 7.50 6.69
(4) 21.47 24.33 20.16 16.99 15.71 14.53 16.57 19.24 19.34 17.85 16.56
(1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(2) 39.30 40.63 39.15 38.92 38.93 38.93 37.95 39.50 37.90 35.70 38.00
(3) 7.38 6.48 6.14 6.40 6.79 7.42 7.57 7.40 6.70 6.20 4.70
(4) 18.78 15.95 15.68 16.24 18.24 19.20 20.40 19.80 17.50 17.50 12.40
notes Row headings are as follows: (1) year, (2) consolidated public sector expen-
ditures/gdp (%), (3) local government expenditure/gdp (%), (4) local government ex-
penditure/consolidated public sector expenditure (%). Source: Ministry of Finance
(http://www.minfin.bg); data for 2012 are based on prognosis.
and 15.7 % in 2004. The reversion of this negative trend happened in
2005, due to the ongoing process of financial decentralization during
the third period of local finance reform and increasing financial au-
tonomy of local governments. The positive dynamics has been accel-
erated by the clear expenditure assignment, transparent intergov-
ernmental transfer system, and local tax authority. In 2008 local gov-
ernments appeared as an important part of the public sector in the
country, accounting for 20.4% of total government spending. At the
same time municipal budgets reached 7.6% of the gdp. In the period
2009–2011, as a result of the reflection of the worldwide economic
crisis in Bulgaria, local government expenditures tend to decrease.
In 2012 local government budgets are expected to reach to 12.4% of
the consolidated budget and 4.7% of gdp.
composition of local revenues
In the beginning of the transition period, local governments have
suffered more than the central government from the decreased fi-
nancial capacity of the public sector in the country. Because of the
advantages of taxation at the central level and spending at the de-
centralized level, public sector in Bulgaria has often ended up with
vertical and horizontal fiscal imbalance. Several problems had a de-
cisive influence on the own-source local revenues, causing a signifi-
cant decline of their relative share, especially during the 1990s.
First of all, the difficult interrelation of the local governments and
the tax administration, which in 1991 became subordinated to the
Ministry of Finance. As a result, the efforts of centrally dependent of-
ficers were aimed at collecting taxes from the larger taxpayers, caus-
ing delays of the local taxes and charges collection and even waste
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table 3 Composition of local revenues (%)
(1) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(2) 3.9 5.1 4.9 19.6 20.4 20.6 8.3 15.2 17.6 18.1 22.0
(3) 0.7 0.9 1.2 2.3 2.5 2.9 0.5 5.0 4.8 4.9 5.2
(4) 96.1 94.9 95.1 77.1 77.7 77.5 91.4 83.9 80.3 81.9 77.6
(5) — — — 3.3 1.9 1.9 0.5 0.9 2.1 — 0.4
(1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 201 2011 2012
(2) 23.9 31.7 33.8 35.6 36.9 40.2 35.4 35.1 32.4 35.5 37.4
(3) 7.0 9.6 9.3 9.5 10.7 13.4 13.4 13.6 11.6 13.1 14.5
(4) 75.7 67.9 65.9 64.0 61.3 58.7 60.3 63.2 67.4 64.4 62.6
(5) 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 1.8 1.1 4.3 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.0
notes Row headings are as follows: (1) year, (2) own-source revenues, (3) lo-
cal taxes, (4) governmental transfers, (5) borrowing. Source: Ministry of Finance
(http://www.minfin.bg); data for 2012 are based on prognosis.
of local revenues. In a dynamic inflationary environment any post-
ponement leaded to additional losses for the municipal budgets. The
second serious problem was the outdated tax base for the property
tax, which was also used for the calculation of inheritance tax, dona-
tion tax, and tax on the property purchase. These were the reasons
why in the period 1991–1997 local taxes accounted for less than 3%
of the local revenues. Especially low was local tax revenue share in
1997 (0.5%), due to the hyperinflation, which additionally devaluated
local tax base. Moreover, it was beyond the municipal competence to
solve the problem. Although autonomous on paper, municipalities
did not have any possibility to influence tax revenues. In addition,
the inability of local governments to impose local charges and to set
their rates freely, particularly in the inflationary situation, resulted in
a growing gap between local revenue potential and the actual costs
of local service provision. This was the reason why in 1990s own-
source revenues accounted for only 12.8% of the total local revenues
on the average.
During the period 2000–2007 local own-source revenues have
gradually increased, from 18.1% toward 40.2% of the total munici-
pal revenues, provoked by the expanding financial decentralization.
Since 2003 local governments have been given full discretion over
local charges and service prices, which have quadrupled their im-
portance in real and relative terms. In 2006 municipalities started to
collect local tax revenues. Especially high is the growth of local taxes
in 2007 and the first half of 2008, due to the considerable revaluation
of the property tax base on the one hand and the newly assigned tax
competences on the other hand. At the same time, because of the
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expansion of the own-source revenues, intergovernmental transfer
system has lost its dominant role in financing local governments in
Bulgaria. However, having in mind the great difference between the
fiscal capacity in several richest municipalities and the rest of the
local governments in the country, for the present the strong inter-
governmental transfer system still has no effective alternative.
Of great significance for the process of strengthening financial
decentralization in Bulgaria were some macroeconomic and finan-
cial factors, such as constantly increasing economic activity, low lev-
els of unemployment, moderate inflation rates, dynamically deceas-
ing public debt, and consolidated budget surpluses exceeding 3% of
the gdp. This process was broken in the autumn of 2008, due to a
new and deep worldwide financial and economic crisis. Due to the
severe financial discipline provided by the Currency Board, which
preserved financial stability, Bulgaria faced the crisis consequences
later and in a milder form than most of the countries all over the
world. In 2009 crisis hit Bulgarian economy with all its might. De-
creasing economic activity (gdp reduction of –5.1%) strongly affected
public finance by reducing government revenues and increasing so-
cial pressure, mainly due to the fast growing unemployment rate.
As a result a budget deficit of 4.7% of the gdp was reported in 2009.
Although completely different from the expected 3% surplus, Bul-
garian budgetary deficit is among the lowest in the European Union.
In addition, bank system remained stable, inflation rate decreased to
2.8%, and public debt did not exceed 15.5% of the gdp.
At the local level economic crisis both sharply reduced local own-
source revenues and – via budget constraints at the central level –
increased the pressure on the grant system. As a result own-source
revenues decreased to 35.4% of the total local revenues in 2008 and
hardly reached 35.1% in 2009. In 2010 own-source revenues de-
creased vastly to 32.4% of the total local revenue. Especially low are
the revenues from the tax on movable and immovable property pur-
chase, mainly because of the collapse of the real estate market, re-
duction of the construction sector, and decrease of motor vehicles
purchases. The increased share of the own-source revenue for 2011
(35.5%) is partly due to the reduction of the state transfers and partly
due to the increase in the tax revenue. In attempts to consolidate the
crisis, national government centralized public sector expenditures,
as the role of the state increased.
Local Finance in Times of Crisis
Current financial crisis is often defined as the worst worldwide eco-
nomic crisis since the Great Depression. However, a brief review of
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table 4 Basic economic indicators
(1) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(2) –11.7 –7.3 –2.4 1.4 2.5 –9.4 –5.6 4.0 2.3 5.4 4.1
(3) 11.1 15.2 15.8 12.8 11.1 12.5 13.7 12.2 16.0 18.1 17.5
(4) 303.2 92.0 73.4 121.3 64.1 121.6 1058.4 18.7 2.6 10.3 7.4
(1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(2) 4.5 5.0 6.6 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.0 –5.1 0.4 1.7 2.9
(3) 15.6 13.7 12.0 10.1 9.0 6.9 5.6 9.1 10.2 11.2 11.2
(4) 5.8 2.3 6.1 5.0 7.3 8.4 12.3 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.2
notes Row headings are as follows: (1) year, (2) annual gdp growth (%),
(3) unemployment rates (%), (4) inflation rates (%). Sources: Ministry of Fi-
nance (http://www.minfin.bg), Bulgarian National Bank (http://www.bnb.bg), Na-
tional Statistical Institute (http://www.nsi.bg), National Employment Agency
(http://www.az.government.bg); data for 2012 are based on prognosis.
the country’s economic development showed that the current down-
turn is not the most severe crisis, faced by Bulgaria during the last 20
years, mainly due to the lessons for fiscal policy drawn from previous
crises and the Currency Board, which preserved financial stability.
Since the beginning of transition from centralized to market based
economy Bulgaria has survived during two extremely difficult pe-
riods. First of all, following the 1990 moratorium on external debt
repayments, Bulgaria lost access to commercial external financing.
During the period 1991–1993 the expansion of the private sector took
place against the background of the steep decline in production and
high unemployment associated with the transition. The cumulative
decline in real gdp during this period reached almost 25%, mainly
due to the drop in domestic demand and loss of the export markets.
The restructuring of the economy resulted in enormous unemploy-
ment rate, which went up to 16% of the labor force and stabilized
around that level. Price liberalization caused severe inflation in 1991
(303.2%). After the initial price shock the inflation rate steadily de-
clined to 73.4% in 1993. However, the sharp changes in relative prices
and costs, and the drop in imports led to additional decline in the
output. Reflecting the economic conjuncture during the period, con-
solidated budgetary deficit reached 12.1% of the gdp and public debt
was calculated to 180% of the gdp.
The second hard period was the financial crisis of 1996–1997. The
two factors, which provoked the crisis, were bad loans on commer-
cial banks’ balance sheets and large government deficits. Until 1996,
commercial credit in Bulgaria was expanded to a degree that was
unprecedented relative to any other European transition economy.
Government attempts to recapitalize the banks failed. The govern-
number 2 · summer 2013 133
Desislava Stoilova
table 5 Public finance indicators
(1) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
(2) –4.5 –7.0 –12.1 –4.6 –5.2 –15.4 –0.4 1.3 0.2 –0.6 –0.6
(3) 180.7 145.6 176.0 180.0 120.0 303.0 96.9 86.0 86.8 77.1 70.1
(1) 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 201 2011 2012
(2) –0.6 0.0 1.7 3.2 3.6 3.8 3.0 –4.7 –3.2 –1.8 –1.3
(3) 55.9 47.9 40.9 33.3 23.0 18.5 15.0 15.5 16.1 16.7 16.2
notes Row headings are as follows: (1) year, (2) budgetary deficit/gdp (%), (3) con-
solidated public debt/gdp (%). Sources: Ministry of Finance (http://www.minfin.bg),
Bulgarian National Bank (http://www.bnb.bg), National Statistical Institute
(http://www.nsi.bg), National Employment Agency (http://www.az.government.bg);
data for 2012 are based on prognosis.
ment replaced bad loans to enterprises with government bonds.
Banks then made additional loans, so their balance sheets did not
improve. The credit crunch was followed by series of bank bankrupt-
cies. The economy slumped as a result of the collapse of the bank
system. At the same time the government bonds increased the level
of government debt (303% of the gdp) and the interest obligations on
this debt ballooned, creating enormous government deficit (–15.4%
of the gdp). Hyperinflation of more than one thousand percent was
registered in 1997, which totally deformed all the economic and fi-
nancial relations.
As a last resort, the Currency Board was introduced on 01 July
1997, in order to restore the confidence in the national currency and
bank system, to impose financial discipline and stabilize the econ-
omy. Generally speaking, Bulgarian Currency Board proved to be a
great success. It established a fixed exchange rate and relied on au-
tomatic mechanisms to restore macroeconomic equilibrium, limit-
ing severely the discretion of policymakers. From hyperinflationary
levels during the first half of 1997, inflation fell to very low levels
in the following years. The significant decrease of nominal interest
rates made it possible for the government to reduce large govern-
ment deficits. The economy started to grow, although more slowly
that might be hoped during a recovery period.
The anti-crisis measures in response to the current worldwide
crisis were taken comparatively late – in the second half of 2009,
mainly due to the national elections in mid July. The efforts of the
newly elected government were aimed at stabilizing public finance
and diminishing budgetary deficit to the end of the year. The gov-
ernment actions were related both to the revenue and expenditure
side of the state budget, mainly intended to increase the efficiency
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in the public sector. First of all, state administration was significantly
reduced (by 15%), and salaries in the public sector were frozen for
an indefinite period of time. As part of the measures intended to
optimize administrative expenses, the Parliamentary Commission
of Regional Policy and Local Self-Government discussed the pos-
sibility of merging municipalities with few citizens. According to
the Law on Administrative Territorial Structure of the Republic of
Bulgaria (‘Zakon za administrativno-teritorialnoto ustroistvo na Re-
publika Bulgaria’ 1995, §8 (1) 1), municipalities must have popula-
tion of at least 6000 in order to be administrative centers. Although
local government in Bulgaria is not very fragmented, having in mind
that the average municipality has 30 000 citizens, such a measure
would affect 53 municipalities with population between 1242 and
5944. However, representatives of the central government declared
that merger of municipalities could become a reality only after
referendum.
Secondly, public sector investments were postponed for better
times. Targeted capital investment subsidy, which used to be a sig-
nificant source of financial resources for the local governments, has
been reduced with 65.8%, from 205.5 million bgn in 2009 to 117 mil-
lion bgn in 2010, 90.2 million bgn in 2011 and 70.2 million bgn in
2012. Under the circumstances, most of the local governments rely
on the European funds for investment financing. Moreover, the cen-
tral government assumed the responsibility to pay on behalf of the
local governments the required 5% project co-financing, in order to
support local investments.
Thirdly, tax collection efforts were strengthened. Bulgaria applies
the lowest tax rates of the personal income tax and corporate in-
come tax (both of them equal to 10%) among the eu countries, so
the most unpopular anti-crisis fiscal measures (decreasing income
taxes) are not applicable (European Commission 2009). Instead, the
National Revenue Agency launched large scale audits of legal enti-
ties and physical persons in order to improve tax collection. More-
over, local governments were given full legal rights of public execu-
tives, meaning in essence that they can levy distraint upon the bank
accounts, salaries, and properties of the incorrect taxpayers. In order
to expand local fiscal capacity, the maximum rates of the tax brack-
ets were increased from 0.2% to 0.45% for the property tax and from
2.6% to 3.0% for the tax on the movable and immovable property pur-
chase. In spite of these measures, public sector revenues dropped
significantly, especially in the second half of 2009, mainly due to the
decreasing economic activity.
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table 6 Public sector arrears
(1) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
(2) 54.8 2.2 4.8 4.6 2.8 8.0 602.2 237.2 169.4 146.9
(3) 74.3 42.3 47.9 51.4 54.2 73.6 196.8 194.3 207.1 179.2
(4) 129.1 44.5 52.7 56.0 57.0 81.6 799.0 431.5 376.5 326.1
(5) 57.5 95.1 90.9 91.9 95.3 90.2 24.6 45.0 55.0 55.0
(6) –2.9 1.3 –5.1 2.4 –1.1 –4.2 –7.8 –1.8 –0.7 –0.3
(7) 0.0 4.3 8.0 9.6 8.9 7.9 –2.4 –10.6 –5.5 –10.4
notes Row headings are as follows: (1) year, (2) central government arrears (mio
bgn), (3) local government arrears (mio bgn), (4) consolidated arrears (mio bgn),
(5) local/consolidated arrears (%), (6) local deficit/expenditures (%), (7) consolidated
deficit/expenditures (%). Source: Ministry of Finance (http://www.minfin.bg); data for
2012 are for q1.
At the same time consolidated public sector arrears increased
nearly ten times, from 81.6 million bgn in the end of 2008 to 799.0
million bgn in the end of 2009. Local government arrears reached
196.8 millions bgn in the end of 2009 and 207.1 millions bgn in the
end of 2011, which is the highest level since the start of financial
decentralization reform. It is interesting to note that public sector
arrears are more rapidly accumulated at the central level than the
local level. During the period 2004–2008 local governments’ arrears
have formed more than 90% of the total public sector arrears. In
the end of 2009 they represent only 24.6%. The increased amount
of local arrears is partly due to the low local revenues. In 2009 only
60.2% of the expected local revenues were actually collected. On the
other hand, pressed by the scarcity of financial resources, central
government retained 10% of the state subsidies for the municipali-
ties, which is in accordance with the regulations of the Annual State
Budget Act 2009 (‘Zakon za darjavnia budget na Republika Bulgaria’
2009, §17).
It is interesting to note, that local governments in Bulgaria have
generally not been sources of severe fiscal deficits in recent years,
as a result of the adopted equalization scheme. According to the
calculations smaller municipalities register lower indebtedness. The
equalization scheme provides smaller local governments with more
subsidies per capita and thus compensates them for the shortage of
funds caused by low fiscal capacity. Because large and medium size
municipalities traditionally rely more on the own-source revenues
than on the governmental transfers, they have lost significant part
of their revenues due to the economic downturn. However, the lo-
cal deficit did not exceed 7.8% of the total municipal expenditure in
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2009 and decreased to 1.8% in 2010 and 0.7% in 2011, so it does not
represent a significant burden on the local budgets.
Conclusion
During the period 1991–2012 Bulgaria hasmade remarkable progress
in reforming and decentralizing local government finance. First
of all, the most important pillars of the legal base of local self-
government have been adopted, providing a stable background of
financial decentralization. Secondly, the importance of local govern-
ments has significantly increased, as a share respectively into the
gross domestic product and consolidated public sector of the coun-
try. Thirdly, expenditure assignment and intergovernmental transfer
system have been put on a clear and transparent basis. Fourthly,
local governments have been given full control over some of the
own-source revenues (local fees, service prices and revenues from
municipal asset management) and limited control over the local tax
levy. As a result local governments became powerful component of
the public sector.
The process of financial decentralization in Bulgaria has been
hampered by the worldwide economic and financial crisis. In spite
of the anti-crisis measures, public sector revenues dropped signifi-
cantly, especially in the second half of 2009, mainly due to the de-
creasing economic activity. The current crisis reached Bulgaria at
comparatively mature stage of financial decentralization reform, but
municipalities can do very little without active central government
support and cannot substitute for it in regard of the basic anti-crisis
measures.
Notes
1. nuts i, nuts ii and nuts iii are the abbreviations respectively of
the level i, ii and iii of the Nomenclature of Territorial Statistical
Units within the meaning of Regulation (ec) no. 1059/2003 of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 May 2003. lau 1 is
denotation for local administrative unit.
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